We establish duality, existence and uniqueness results for a class of mass transportations problems. We extend a technique of W. Gangbo 9] using the Euler Equation of the dual problem. This is done by introducing the h-Fenchel Transform and using its basic properties. The cost functions we consider satisfy a generalization of the so-called Spence-Mirrlees condition which is well-known by economists in dimension 1. We therefore end this article by a somehow unexpected application to the economic theory of incentives.
1 Introduction and main statement
Assumptions and notations
Let us rst recall that, given a probability space ( 1 ; A 1 ; 1 ), a measurable space ( 2 ; A 2 ) and a measurable map f : 1 ! 2 , the push-forward of 1 through f, denoted f] 1 is the probability measure on ( 2 ; A 2 ) de ned by: f] 1 (B) := 1 (f ?1 (B)) for every B 2 A 2 .
In all the following, is some bounded connected open subset of R n , and is some probability measure in which is absolutely continuous with respect to the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure, with a positive Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure and such that (@ ) = 0.
We are also given a compact Polish space Y , a Radon probability measure on Y and a function h : Y ! R which satis es: h 2 C 0 ( Y; R); (1) for every ! there exists c(!) > 0 such that for all (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 ! 2 sup y2Y jh(x 1 ; y) ? h(x 2 ; y)j c(!)kx 1 ? x 2 k; (2) for all y 2 Y , h(:; y) is di erentiable in and for all (y 1 ; y 2 ; x) 2 Y 2 @h @x (x; y 1 ) = @h @x (x; y 2 ) ) y 1 = y 2 :
As we will explain more precisely later on, assumption (3) is a generalization of the so-called single-crossing or Spence-Mirrlees condition which is well-known in economics.
Our aim is to study the following Monge's mass transportation problem: 
Main result
If is a given real-valued function de ned on , we de ne the h-Fenchel (x) + (s(x)) = h(x; s(x)), for all x 2 ; s 2 ( ; ) and is a solution of (M), and (id; s)] is a solution of (MK), 4) uniqueness also holds: if s is a solution of (M) then s = s -a.e., (id; s)] is the unique solution of (MK), and if ( ; ) is a solution of (D) then ? (respectively ? ) is equal to some constant -a.e. (respectively -a.e.).
In Section 2, technical lemmas are established and basic properties of the h-Fenchel transform are proved. In Section 3, the main result is proved.
Finally, in Section 4, we adress a question arising in the economic theory of incentives and show how assumption (3) can be interpreted as a natural generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition. In this framework, our main result enables to prove a general re-allocation principle.
The problem of optimal measure preserving maps (M) has received a lot of attention since related questions naturally arise in uid mechanics 2], differential geometry (see 16] for relation with a classical result of Aleksandrov 1]), shape optimization 4] , functional analysis 11], 12], probability 19] and economics. In the case Y R n and h(x; y) = x y, the problem was solved by Brenier 3] who proved the important Polar Factorization Theorem and existence and uniqueness of an optimal map which is the gradient of some convex potential. This result was then extended by Mc Cann and Gangbo 10] for costs of the form c(x ? y) with c strictly convex. The result stated in Theorem 1, is very much in that spirit since it expresses existence and uniqueness of an optimal allocation map which is a measurable selection of the h-subdi erential of some h-convex potential. Similar characterization results were obtained by V. Levin 13 ] using a di erent approach based on cyclical monotonicity and the relaxed problem (MK).
Technical preliminaries and h-Fenchel Transform
In what follows will always denote some function : ! R f+1g and some function : Y ! R f+1g. for all x so ( h ) h = , with (8) we get ( h ) h and since (y 0 ; t 0 ) is arbitrary in A taking the supremum yields ( h ) h V so that V = ( h ) h using (7).
The characterization of ( h ) h is proved in the same way. Using Proposition 2, we get r( 1 ? 2 ) = 0 a.e. in hence the desired result, since is connected.
We end this section by a result which will play a crucial role in the proof of the main result. The next Proposition is actually a straightforward generalization of a result of Gangbo 9] which was an important tool in 9] to prove Brenier's Theorem. (9) Since ( n A) = 0, (9) is satis ed a.e. in . Proof.
Let x 2 A, rst we have:
And, for all r 2 (?1; 1):
r (x) = h(x; y r ) ? (y r ) ? rf(y r ) for all y r 2 @ h r (x):
Let r n be some sequence of (?1; 1) n f0g which converges to 0 and relabel some sequence y rn 2 @ h rn (x) into y n .
Step 1 Let us show rst that y n ! s(x) as n ! +1.
Up to a subsequence we may assume that y n converges to y 2 Y . First note that:
and:
rn (x) = h(x; y n ) ? (y n ) ? r n f(y n ):
Since is l.s.c., we get:
lim n (y n ) (y) so that passing to the limit in (13) and then y 2 @ h 0 (x) = fs(x)g, s(x) is therefore the only cluster point of y n so that the whole sequence converges to s(x).
Step 2
First, we have: 1 r n rn (x) ? 0 (x)] = 1 r n (h(x; y n ) ? (y n )) ? (h(x; s(x)) ? (s(x))] ? f(y n ): (14) On the one hand:
h(x; y n ) ? (y n ) h(x; s(x)) ? (s(x)) (15) on the other hand:
h(x; y n ) ? (y n ) h(x; s(x)) ? (s(x)) + r n f(y n ) ? f(s(x))] (16) using (15), (16) and the fact that y n converges to s(x) and passing to the limit in (14) we obtain:
since ( 
3 Proof of the main statement
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. First note that one obviously has: 
Remark. If ( ; ) 2 E h and s 2 ( ; ) (respectively 2 ?( ; )) are such that J(s) = L( ; ) (respectively K( ) = L( ; )) then ( ; ) is a solution of (D) and s is a solution of (M) (respectively is a solution of (MK)).
The rst step of the proof is:
Lemma 1 There exists a solution ( ; ) of (D), moreover if ( ; ) is a solution of (D) then is h-convex, is h-convex and those functions are conjugate to each other: = h -a.e. and = h -a.e..
Proof.
Note rst that it is clear from (20) that the value of (D) is nite.
Step 1 We rst prove that if ( ; ) 2 E h is a solution of (D) then: and (f > h g) = 0 this also implies (f > ( h ) h g) = 0 since ( h ) h h and (21) is proved.
Step 2 We now prove existence. Let ( n ; n ) 2 E N h be some minimizing sequence of (D), noting that L( n + a; n ? a) = L( n ; n ) and using (21), we may assume with no loss of generality that n = h n , n = h n and: inf Y n = 0 (22) also note that the in mum in (22) is attained since n is l.s.c. say at some point z n . Since n 0 we get rst:
n max Y h and since n (z n ) = 0: n h(:; z n ) min Y h so that n (x) is bounded uniformly in n and x 2 . On the other hand, using the fact that n is h-convex and Proposition 4.2, assertion 2), we get that n is locally Lipschitz uniformly in n. Using Ascoli's Theorem, we may assume, up to a subsequence that n converges uniformly on compact subsets of to some bounded and locally Lipschitz function .
Step 3 Let us prove that is itself h-convex. De ne, for all x 2 :
e (x) := sup taking the supremum in the previous nally proves = e so that is hconvex.
Step 4
Let := h (so that ( ; ) 2 E h ) and let us prove that ( ; ) is a solution of (D). Lebesgue's dominated convergence Theorem yields rst:
Now since, for all (x; y) 2 Y , n (y) h(x; y) ? n (x) we get:
lim n n h = (24) using (24) and Fatou's Lemma we get: (25) By (23) and (25) and using s] = we have:
Finally, using (20) we get:
which proves that s is a solution of(M) and is a solution of (MK), hence the desired result.
The last thing to prove is uniqueness:
Lemma 3 Let ( ; ), s and be as in the previous Lemma, the following 
(33) and (32) yield:
(x) + (s(x)) = h(x; s(x)); for -almost every x 2 or equivalently s(x) 2 @ h (x) a.e.. 
Economic application and generalized SpenceMirrlees condition
We end this article by an application of our result to the theory of incentives. More precisely, we are going to prove a re-allocation principle that generalizes a well-known one in dimension 1.
Assume that agents' preferences are given by the quasi-linear utility function:
V (x; y; t) = h(x; y) + t; where x 2 is the agent's type or parameter, y 2 Y is an action and t 2 R is some monetary compensatory transfer. We make the same assumptions on , Y , h and as previously. Note that in this case, the probability measure captures the distribution of types among agents. A key concept in that theory is that of incentive-compatible contracts:
De nition 4 1) A contract is a pair of functions (s; t) : ! Y R.
2) The potential associated with a contract (s; t) is the function V s;t de ned by: V s;t (x) := h(x; s(x)) + t(x) for all x 2 :
3) The contract (s; t) is incentive-compatible if and only if:
h(x; s(x)) + t(x) h(x; s(x 0 )) + t(x 0 ); for all (x; x 0 ) 2 2 : (37) 4) note nally that, with (38), the previous expression has the sign of (x 0 ? x)(s(x) ? s(x 0 )) so that s is nondecreasing. 
Re-allocation principle in the general case
Our aim now is to consider the general problem where is a bounded connected open subset of R n , and is some probability measure in which is absolutely continuous with a positive Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and such that (@ ) = 0, Y is a compact Polish space and h satis es (1), (2) and (3).
We shall prove a similar re-allocation principle as in the one dimensional case so that (3) Remark. The economic interpretation of this result is the following : any allocation plan can be rearranged into some implementable one in a unique way ; s is therefore in some sense a monotone rearrangement of s 0 and it is obtained by maximizing the average surplus in the set of measure-preserving maps ( ; s 0 ] ).
Moreover, at least from a theoretical point of view, one can use our main result to nd a tarif t such that the pair (s; t) is incentive compatible. Let ( ; ) be a solution of the dual problem of (39), and de ne for all x 2 : t(x) := ? (s(x)) = ?h(x; s(x)) + (x); then it can be checked easily that the pair (s; t) is an incentive-compatible contract, let us indeed consider a pair of types (x; x 0 ), we have:
h(x; s(x)) + t(x) = (x) = h (x) h(x; s(x 0 )) ? (s(x 0 )) = h(x; s(x 0 )) + t(x 0 ):
